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Conflict Assessment: Kenyan Election Crisis

Introduction:

The Kenyan election crisis of 2007-2008 resulted in 1,500 dead, 3,000 raped, and 300,000 internally displaced (Roberts, 2). What began as a cry against fraudulent elections and corrupt executive power quickly became a battle based on ethnic identity and economic desperation. By using Wehr’s model for conflict assessment, we hope to address the key players, relationships, contextual issues, and underlying causes in the Kenyan election crisis. This assessment will reveal the unmet capacities that both international and domestic players had to predict and quite possibly prevent this conflict.

Parties Involved:

The parties involved in the 2007-8 crisis in Kenya can be divided into three key categories for further exploration. First is the united front of Mwai Kibaki and the Party of National Unity, which was supported by groups such as the Kikuyu ethnic tribe and the military. Second is the Orange Democratic Party, led by Raila Odinga, with support drawn in from the youth as well as the Luo and Kalenjin tribes. Lastly, we come to the international community and its efforts to engage in the conflict through stabilization and negotiation initiatives.

Domestic Community:

Before the 2007 elections, Kibaki was the incumbent president of Kenya, having been elected in 2002 as part of the National Rainbow Coalition. His presidency was faced with many challenges, such as public disapproval of the decision of legislators to give themselves raises, internal power struggles within his coalition, and difficulties drafting the new Kenyan Constitution. Interested in running for re-election in December 2007, Kibaki formed the Party of National Unity (PNU), a coalition comprised of his allies. A Kikuyu himself, many of the member parties in the PNU represented Kikuyu groups or similar ethnic communities (“Kenya”). Kibaki’s power originated from the legitimacy awarded to his political office and his control over the Kenyan military, both of which he utilized in suppressing protests once election results were released in 2007.

The Kikuyu are the largest ethnic group in Kenya, comprising twenty-two percent of the population. At the time of the election, many Kikuyu groups supported political parties with their group interests in mind and thereby combined to form the PNU (“Kenya”). As election violence progressed, many Kikuyus were forced from their communities and homes and the PNU lost much of its power. Displacement remained an unresolved problem for a year after the conflict officially ended (Wrong).

The main opponent running in opposition to Kibaki in the 2007 presidential election was Raila Odinga, a member of the Orange Democratic Movement coalition. Odinga was well-known in politics, having originally been in Kibaki’s National Rainbow Coalition and serving in Parliament for over a decade. The Orange Democratic Movement drew power from the support of a majority of Parliament. As compared to Kibaki’s PNU coalition, the Orange Democratic Movement is comprised of “parties representing nearly everyone else” (“Kenya”). Before being elected in 2002, Kibaki spoke of bringing Kenya together across ethnic lines; however, once in office, he removed all non-Kikuyus from office and formed a coalition to oppose Odinga in the 2007 elections (Zarembka). Odinga ran on a campaign to reinstate unifying initiatives, with special attention paid to the Luo tribe, of which he is a member, and the Kalenjin tribe. Both of these tribes resented the Kikuyu for their dominant economic and political roles in Kenya.


The Kalenjin were exceptionally strong in their opposition to the Kikuyu, so when the news broke out that Kibaki won the election, the Kalenjin became militant and forced the Kikuyu out of the Rift valley (Wrong).

International Community:

Many in the international arena were interested and concerned about the 2007 election crisis in Kenya, especially considering that Kenya’s reputation had been an exceptionally positive one since its independence (“Kenya”). The necessity of international involvement became clear when Odinga stated that any negotiation efforts would be mere “sideshow[s]” unless an international mediator was present (Kanina and Miriri). The African Union, represented by Ghanaian President John Kufuor, was involved in initial mediation efforts between the two presidential opponents. With little success met through the AU, Kofi Annan, the former UN secretary General, became the primary leader in mediation (“Kofi”). The UN and then Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed support for Kofi Annan’s mediations and provided humanitarian assistance while the crisis was being mediated. There was a strong belief within the international community that the post-conflict process in Kenya needed to be closely monitored until an agreement could be forged (United Nations).



Past Relationships Between Parties: 1991-2002


Following the declaration of Kenyan independence in 1963, the government structure was developed so as to house multiple parties. However, the reality was that the state was completely run by one party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). Through coercion and threats, the government, headed by President Jomo Kenyatta, kept all other political parties at bay. By the time of Kenyatta’s death in 1978, KANU’s hegemony was on the decline. Kenyatta was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi, who attempted to revitalize KANU by declaring Kenya a one-party state in 1982 (Khadiagla, 67).

This declaration caused many problems and led to mass protests. In December 1991, the constitutional ban on parties was rescinded. This change was sparked by an event that took place in February 1991, when Oginga Odinga attempted to register a new political party, the National Democratic Party, but was denied. This denial led to the formation of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). FORD was launched in July 1991 as an organization of individuals who were committed to repealing the constitutional ban on political parties (Khadiagla, 68).

In the month preceding the 1992 elections, political parties were becoming more and more ethnically defined, with KANU composed mostly of Kalenjin, and the opposition parties rallying around Kikuyu and Luo support. FORD began to fall apart as the elections drew nearer as a result of the factionalism, with leaders growing divided over different views of party politics, ethnicity, and generation (Throup and Hornsby, 94).

Two groups emerged from the fragmentation of FORD: FORD Kenya, comprised of Luo and Luyia and led by Odinga, and FORD Asili, mostly Kikuyu and led by Kenneth Matiba (Khadiagla, 69). The Democratic Party (DP), led by Mwai Kibaki also materialized at this time. To counter the emergence of opposition groups, KANU rallied minority ethnic groups in the Rift Valley by preventing Kikuyu and Luo from accessing land and resources. This led to a series of ethnic cleansings in the Rift Valley in 1991 and 1992.

Although the emergence of opposition parties mobilized voters, it also led the KANU-dominated Parliament to change election regulation to requiring a candidate to receive at least 25% of the vote in order to win (Khadiagla 70). In the 1992 elections, Moi and KANU won 36% of the vote, even though opposition parties amassed 62% of votes (Khadiagla 70). As a result of their fragmentation, they lost the election.

In the years leading up to the 1997 election, the desire for changes in the Constitution once again shook up all political parties. Raila Odinga created his own party, the National Democratic Party. The 1997 elections were characterized by the administrative chaos of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). Opposition allegations of rigging by the ECK on behalf of KANU dominated the post-electorate climate (Khadiagla 73). KANU won with 41% of the vote but only gained four more seats than the combined opposition in Parliament. This led to a significant shift in the opposition; Kibaki’s DP emerged as the dominant party, also replacing FORD Asili as the key party in the Kikuyu heartland. This new dynamic of politics largely set the stage for the 2002 election.



Relationship Continuum Between Parties: 2002-2007


The interaction between Mwai Kibaki’s party, Party of National Unity (PNU), and Raila Odinga’s party, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), can be traced back to the election of 2002. Relationships between these two parties did not exist long enough for much movement to occur along the continuum of five stages. Instead, the interactions follow the stages and arrive at the conflict stage during the election of 2007.


The two parties were in the cooperation stage during the election of 2002. In order to defeat the incumbent’s party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), Kibaki’s former party, the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), formed a coalition named the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Roberts). NARC encompassed all of the major Kenyan tribes and chose Kibaki to be the candidate for the presidential election. The NARC drafted a Memorandum of Understanding that provided for equal sharing of cabinet posts between LDP and NAK when Kibaki finally take office (KNCHR). The election resulted in a landslide victory for Kibaki.


After the election, the relationship between the two parties hit the competition stage. Internal conflict began to emerge within the NARC coalition due to the LDP’s assessment that the NAK, particularly President Kibaki, did not honor the MOU that both parties had signed before the 2002 elections. The LDP assessed that “the appointments favored the NAK,” especially those who were originally from “the president’s central province while neglecting other areas” (Ochieng). The disagreement over allocation of resources heated up in 2003 when President Kibaki expelled members of the Kalenjin tribe from the Mau Forest (Roberts, 11). The Kalenjin tribe was one of the major tribes that comprised the LDP, and President Kibaki’s decision to throw them out of the Mau Forest angered the entire party. Finally, the NARC coalition fell apart when Raila Odinga formed the ODM, which was largely comprised of a tribal alliance between the Kalenjin, Luhyas, and Luos. President Kibaki and the Kikuyu formed the PNU after the coalition was divided. ODM ran a ‘No’ campaign against the constitution referendum that President Kibaki tried to pass. The referendum stated that the President intended to enhance executive power and refused to address a reinforcement of legislative and judicial arms (ICG). Following the vote on the referendum, the party completely fell apart.


The two parties arrived at a heightened tension stage during the pre-election campaign when the ODM began questioning the independence of the General Elections’ Electoral Commission after President Kibaki “did not renew the tenure of Commission Chairman Samuel Kivuitu until November”(KNCHR, 26). Both parties were also running negative campaigns against one another, with the ODM portraying PNU as a party of “old men clinging onto power” that only granted power to members of the Kikuyu tribe, while the ODM was presented as “the broad-based party for progressive change”(KNCHR, 27). Both parties transformed general issues into ethnic issues. For example, corruption was advertised as a Kikuyu problem, while opposition to the Kibaki government was interpreted as a Luo agenda (KNCHR, 27). The heightened tension lasted until the election day, when allegations of marked ballots and rigged results grew and were further fanned by the live broadcast of leaders disputing the results coming in from the constituencies. The heightened tension finally turned into a conflict when the results were announced and ODM supporters began challenging the legality of the election.



Conflict Context: Individual and Group

Individual:


The individual level of this conflict can be assessed using Konrad Lorenz’s concept of militant enthusiasm. This is based on a situation where an individual has a tendency to lose his/her normal inhibitions against violence when united with others who are similarly motivated (Barash, 99). This is apparent in the ethnic and political make-up of the parties in conflict. Odinga supporters felt unified amongst their fellow Luos and Kalenjin tribesmen who were fighting against the alleged rigging of elections, lost their inhibitions regarding violent conflict, and subsequently turned their aggressions against Kibaki supporters and the Kikuyu people. The violence between the two parties launched the overall conflict to a group level. The loss of inhibitions illustrated a mob psychology, where individuals engaged in acts that they would not have done if they were acting alone (Barash, 125). A concept developed by Sigmund Freud can also be used to assess this conflict. Freudian narcissism describes the joint feeling of pain and grievance when a member of a group is attacked or hurt (Barash, 103). This can be illustrated in the Kenyan conflict between opposing ethnic and political groups whose attacks were taken personally and were transformed into a need for vengeful justice. As a result, conflict became fueled by ethnocentric motivations and spiraled out of control. Nonetheless, certain individuals sought violence outside of groups, as exemplified by the killing of MPs from opposing parties (Gettleman, 1).


Individual’s actions are largely influenced by their experiences, with most psychologists and sociologists maintaining that violence stems from responses to experiences rather than genetic instinct (Barash, 108). The history of violence surrounding political elections in Kenya played a major role in the conflict that occurred in 2007. Furthermore, these experiences have created assumptions that will inspire further violence.


Group:


At the group level of conflict, members of homogenous groups are more likely to respond to conflictual situations with hostility than groups with heterogeneous membership (Barash, 126). The group level of the Kenyan election crisis involved numerous members of ethnic and political groups communicating with one another in order to carry out organized and orchestrated violence against opposing groups.

Conflict Context: Cultural and Behavioral

Cultural:

The most vital cultural determinant in the Kenyan election crisis of 2007-2008 was the nation’s long-standing history of ethnic tension. The Kenyan population is largely split between five tribal groups: Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), and Kamba (11%) (Roberts, 6). Political parties fall under these same ethnic divisions. Historically, violence between ethnic factions stemmed primarily from land disputes. Still fostering a deep connection to land that has been unequally distributed, contemporary political groups still find themselves in conflict with one another. Tribal groups often feel as though the only way they can gain resources for themselves and those within their groups is through gaining political power.

In Kenyan culture, elders are valued above all other members of society. During the election crisis, large numbers of jobless, young men were chief instigators in violent protest. Currently, 89% of Kenya’s population is under the age of 31; however, the nation’s governmental body does not reflect this demographic (Ndungu, 120). The younger population within Kenya is suffering from an extreme intergenerational gap, with elders holding the vast majority of political power. As a result, youth feel that their voices will only be heard through violent means.

Another cultural factor that led to extreme violence during the election crisis was a tradition of disrespect toward women. Following the election crisis, hospital visits for sexual abuses increased two to three-fold. Post-conflict reports estimate that as many as 3,000 women were raped during the election crisis (Roberts, 2). Most sexual assaults took place in Kibera, the slum surrounding Nairobi, where women would be attacked while attempting to travel to or from their homes. Rape, which is commonly accepted as a tool of warfare, was often a tactic utilized against opposing ethnic groups or political parties during the election crisis (Shekhawat, 14).

Behavioral:

Long-standing frustration against governmental abuses of power fueled the violence that ensued following elections in 2007. After experiencing a series of tyrannical executives, most Kenyans believed that politicians would do virtually anything to gain power and wealth for themselves. In addition, unequal land distribution that dates back to the colonial era remains a source of frustration for many Kenyans who wish to see the government address past abuses. The election in 2007 provided a perfect window of opportunity for those who were feeling frustration against the Kenyan government to become aggressive. The election crisis erupted as quickly and intensely as it did because of the built-up frustrations of the local population.

Many Kenyans were also driven to violence because of a sense of relative deprivation. Kikuyus, who are the dominant ethnic group in Kenya, have historically felt disadvantaged in comparison to other ethnic groups. The election crisis provided the Kikuyus, as well as other ethnic groups who felt deprived, with an excuse to vent out their frustrations on opposing groups. With the gap between the poor and the rich in Kenya growing dramatically, a wider sense of relative deprivation also pervades the population (Ndungu, 113). Political elite in Kenya earn as much as four-hundred times more than the average worker (Roberts, 5). Widespread poverty is a constant source of frustration for most Kenyans, especially when officials create lavish lifestyles for themselves out of corruption.



Conflict Dynamic

Latent Conflict:

Kenyan citizens experienced years of political dissatisfaction and resentment. The previous governments of Jomo Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki continuously failed to comprehensively address problems plaguing certain ethnic groups (Ndunga). Successive Kenyan administrations have favored the majority Kikuyu ethnic group, both economically and politically, against smaller ethnic groups, including Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba, Kisii and others (Cooke). Ethnicity continued to be the principal factor in political races and alliances; long-standing economic frustrations and lack of representation allowed resentment to grow in Kenyan citizens.

Conflict Emergence:

The December 27th, 2007 presidential election results ignited the violent crisis that took over Kenya. The major opponent, Raila Odinga maintained the lead in election polls throughout the week and election day, yet Mwai Kibaki was announced as the reelected winner. Just minutes after Kibaki was sworn in, violence broke out across the nation.

At the outset, violence was primarily directed against the Kikuyu, especially in the Rift Valley and Western Province. Gangs of youths blocked Kenya’s main roads and set fire to hundreds of homes of perceived ‘outsiders’. In Mathare, a slum in Nairobi, Luo gangs burned more than 100 Kikuyu homes. Violent clashes with police erupted in Odinga’s home province of Nyanza and in the densely populated slums of Nairobi. Opposers set to burn, destroy and kill the Kikuyu. There was also an alarming amount of sexual violence and rape in Nairobi’s slum areas (Abwao). The election seemed to tap into the tribal tension that always laid beneath the surface in Kenya, but until now had not provoked widespread mayhem.

Conflict Escalation:

As the weeks went by, the conflict continued to intensify following the escalation model of conflict spiral. The Kikuyu began retaliation killings, especially in the Rift Valley area. The crisis went from specific to general and from a few problems to many problems, in the span of a month. The crisis spread to effect women, tribes, the economy and most public services. More than 1,200 people were killed and around 350,000 were displaced into temporary camps. Food security was further threatened due to farmer’s moving or running away from their farms. The education and health sectors were also weakened by the large-scale displacement of professionals (Abwao).

The election seems to have tapped into an atavistic vein of tribal tension that always lay beneath the surface in Kenya but until now had not provoked widespread mayhem (Gettleman).

Stalemate:

A month in, the killings, burnings and protesting continued without a sign of ending. At this point both the parties were using maximum force to gain control. The situation would be considered both a hurting stalemate and an issue of conflict ripeness. If something did not change very soon, Kenya could completely fall apart economically, socially and politically. Countries who historically provided Kenya with aid were becoming hesitant to continue; the European Parliament threatened to freeze aid if a political solution was not found (Gettleman).

Political entrapment was very obvious, as both Kibaki and Odinga’s coalitions refused to give up or give in. Their goals were becoming very clear; the Kibaki government was determined to hold onto power, while at the same time Odinga announced a swearing-in ceremony to declare him the “people’s president.” The police, who supported Kibaki, were violently attacking, killing or arresting opposition protestors. Opposition protesters were relentless in their fight; even as numbers decreased, those who continued were even more engaged and determined. Neither group was willing to concede with such high stakes on the table.

De-Escalation/Negotiation

Push from the international community began the de-escalation process. Leaders from the United States, European Union, Ghana, Tanzania and even Desmond Tutu of South Africa offered their advice and resources (Cooke). Separately, both Kibaki and Odinga agreed that the violence needed to stop for the sake of Kenya. They next agreed to meet with former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to begin the mediation process. Annan planned to settle the disputes over the elections, specifically the accusations pointed at Kibaki’s administration for rigging the elections.

Kibaki and Odinga went from being immersed in their personal battles to allowing for compromise and negotiation. This change was due to continued international pressure to end the violence and instability in Kenya. They agreed to begin talks only if an outside mediator was present; both Kibaki and Odinga would not meet on their own.

Dispute Settlement

Since the conflict grew to take on several different issues; the settlement process struggled to tackle them fairly. The topics of discussion included the of ending the violence, the humanitarian situation, resolving the political crisis, and land and historical injustices.The first thing addressed was the rigged elections; after some negotiating, Annan was able to get Kabaki and Odinga to agree on a grand coalition government. On February 28th 2008, Kibaki and Odinga signed the agreement meant to end the crisis, it was called the National Accord and Reconciliation Act. Kibaki would remain President, but Odinga would take on the newly created position of Prime Minister, and the cabinet would be split for equal representation.

Next, the Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, a large civil group that formed after the 2007 elections, wanted to tackle those who rigged the elections. They created a long list of alleged charges, ranging from forgery to “subverting the rule of law,” against all 22 electoral commissioners and some staff (“Kofi Annan”). A type of trial or retribution process was being created to handle these allegations. This list went to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, who promised to take action if Kenya did not.

The mediation established four commissions: a Constitutional Review Commission; an Independent Review Commission to examine the electoral process (Kriegler Commission); a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (Waki Commission). The Kriegler Commission called for sweeping electoral reforms prior to the 2012 elections and the Waki Commissions called for the creation of a Special Kenyan Tribunal to bring the ringleaders of the violence to trial and for the comprehensive reform of the Kenyan police force (Cooke).



Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Conclusion

Just because a coalition government and new commissions were created, the transition to peace cannot be a guaranteed or stable process. The Kenyan leadership agreed to a political compromise under intense international and domestic pressure. The implementation process shows the government’s commitment to peace-building. Tackling years of injustice and the amounts of violence and resentment in particular ethnic groups of Kenya will be a long and challenging process.

Resolving issues concerning truth and justice, particularly the issues of corruption and past violence, means that both parties will have to give up some of their privileges. Many of these reforms have yet to be effectively handled, and the 2012 elections are right around the corner. Constitutional reform, electoral reform, effectively tackling corruption, restructuring a highly inequitable economy, and addressing historic grievances around land ownership are all critical challenges that must be overcome if Kenya wants to move forward in becoming a more stable and democratic nation.



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